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Defined by an eclectic collection of food carts, the market for street food in 
Portland, Oregon experienced an explosive expansion from 2006 to 2011. I seek to 
understand why and how this growth occurred. My research identifies a unique 
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development and my econometric model of exit probability and robust firm-level 
dataset describe the characteristics of market growth. I interpret observed trends 
in the context of fundamental economic theories of industrial organization and 
market interaction, testing the applicability of theoretical microeconomic 
relationships in real-world scenarios. 
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research 
 “There are few men among those who throng the restaurants who bother to suspect 
that he who first invented them must have been a genius and a profound observer of his 
fellows” 
Introduction 
Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, in his revolutionary Physiology of Taste (1825), 
was among the first to recognize the cultural gravity of what was then a radical 
invention but today a regular institution—the restaurant. The conception of the 
restaurant in Paris in the late 1770’s helped open diners from aristocratic royal families 
to the ignoble working classes to a new way of life, centered upon one of man’s most 
vital organs: his stomach. Dining out allowed for the “impassioned, considered, and 
habitual preference for whatever pleases the taste;” the pursuit of life defined by the 
best of both the kitchen and the parlor (Brillat-Savarin, 1825). 
Restaurants provided anyone who could afford at least a pint of beer consistent 
access to high quality, well-prepared food—not to mention the opportunity to rub 
elbows with other diners from up and down the socioeconomic ladder and across the 
political spectrum. Restaurants began in the salons of Paris’s finest hotels and catered to 
the city’s wealthiest families and most distinguished bourgeoisie. But there were also, 
from the outset, those that served the masses: “Some of the restaurateurs decided to try 
to wed good living to economy, and by their appealing to men of modest fortune, who 
are necessarily the most numerous, to assure themselves of the greatest number of 
patrons” (Brillat-Savarin, 1825). These restaurants, for the population of any large city 
across time and space, “are the solution of a seemingly insolvable problem: how to live 
well and at the same time moderately and even cheaply” (Brillat-Savarin, 1825). 
Quality goods served in restaurants to proletarian customers were vital to the 
progression of Europe’s middle and working classes in the 18th and 19th centuries. Yet 
the appeal of such a plebeian meal continues in the United States today. The concept of 
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living well and dining richly while maintaining a relatively humble budget resonates in 
contemporary American society perhaps nowhere more strongly than in Portland, 
Oregon. As such, the true expression of Portland’s current gastronomic atmosphere is 
not found in hotel bars or high-rise dining rooms. Instead, “food carts”—repurposed 
trailers, military kitchens, custom-built bicycles, and wooden sheds—line Portland’s 
city blocks in a myriad of mismatched styles and colors. These carts represent the 
culmination of decades of local “love of high-quality food, creative entrepreneurship, 
and appreciation of good value” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). They are the definitive 
culinary color of the city. Each food cart offers its own unique menu and dining 
experience: taco and torta trucks patrol the city; sandwich, sausage, soup, and sushi 
stalls stand side by side in downtown parking lots; falafel is served alongside shawrma 
to eager eaters at neighborhood “cart pods.” These food carts, according to urban 
planners Rodgers and Roy (2010), “are the logical outgrowth of all [Portland’s 
attributes]—a direct reflection of the city’s personality.”  
Scope of Work 
Portland’s food carts are an integral part of the complete economic system 
defined by the city itself. Yet while food carts are often talked about, they are rarely 
studied. To remedy this, my central objective in this project is to complete a 
comprehensive analysis of Portland’s street vendors—to understand their existence and 
operation as thoroughly as possible. For Portland’s food carts, this is no small task; their 
market is dynamic, and its trends are complex.  
Towards this objective, I undertake three discrete, though related tasks. First, I 
clarify why food carts thrive in Portland. Second, I describe certain important 
characteristics of their economic environment. Third, I ask how Portland food carts 
function in their market and explain why they operate as they do. With these objectives 
realized, we—both the reader and myself—will find ourselves equipped with a better 
understanding of food carts economics.  
The products of my investigation are valuable information for the understanding 
and decision making of agents in this market, but there’s a larger point. Economics is 
full of theoretical explanations of a host of phenomena: how markets are structured, 
how firms behave, and what drives basic human decisions have been explained on 
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classroom chalkboards for over a century. But when the lecture ends and we step onto 
the chaotic streets of the real world, well-behaved economic ideals fly out the window 
as we walk out the door and towards the nearest food cart. Or do they? An in-depth 
analysis of this market over time affords a rare opportunity to evaluate and understand 
the essence of many market mechanisms. Granted, this is not a market we are 
accustomed to thinking about in this context. Street food stalls are not Wall Street 
stocks. But it’s a market nonetheless. And as we’ll see, its study proffers insights into 
the applicability of economic theory to real world scenarios. 
Origins 
The above statement from Rodgers and Roy regarding Portland’s food carts 
begs a question: what about the city’s personality makes food carts such a logical 
product of its culture? Portland did by no means invent the food cart. The concept of 
street food has existed in the United States for decades and around the world for 
centuries. Moreover, Portland is by no means home to a street food scene as impressive 
as those of Singapore, a metropolis defined by its dazzling concentrations of street food 
hawkers (Gold, 2007); Bangkok, where entire city parks come alive with street food 
stalls almost nightly (Brunton, 2013); or Tokyo, where sushi stalls worthy of Michelin 
stars have thrived in subway stations (Gelb, 2012). So why Portland? And why food 
carts? From an economist’s perspective, the answers to these questions lie on both the 
demand and supply sides of the market. 
The Demand Curve 
Markets grow when people demand more of a good or service. Without 
consumers to purchase what is being made, there is no rational motivation for a firm to 
produce a product. Accordingly, my analysis of Portland’s penchant for street food 
begins on the demand side, with the longstanding cultural factors that have set the table 
for an individualized culinary explosion. Foremost among these cultural elements is, 
above all else, the city’s enduring appreciation for good food and excellent dining. This 
sentiment begins with Portland native James Beard, heralded “the dean of American 
cookery” by the New York Times in 1954 and the “patron saint of American culinary 
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values” by contemporary scholars (Kamp, 2006). Beard’s impact on American 
gastronomy and society is undeniable. For Beard, culinary culture was inseparable from 
political culture; it was an equally integral aspect of art, entertainment, fashion, family, 
community, and society as a whole. Beginning in 1939 with the launch of his catering 
company and continuing until his death in 1985, Beard’s 30 published cookbooks, years 
of gastronomic writing, national television shows, and culinary product lines 
revolutionized the way in which America viewed its food. And with the foundation of a 
branch of his renowned culinary school in nearby Seaside, Beard ensured his impact 
would be felt with even greater intensity in his hometown. 
Portlanders today have by no means forgotten about Beard. In 2013, four 
Portland chefs were nominated for his namesake award, America’s premier culinary 
prize (Tierney, 2013). Moreover, no fewer than 12 Portland restaurants are owned or 
operated by past James Beard award winners, to add to the 11 run by past nominees 
(Loftesness, 2013). 
Yet James Beard is not the sole figure in the history of Portland’s cultural 
gastronomy. Caprial Pence—who, by the age of 30, had cooked for The US 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the Sultan of Kuala Lumpur, and Julia Child—and her 
husband continued to advanced Portland’s gastronomic tradition in the 1990’s with their 
culinary television show and Westmoreland neighborhood restaurant (Pence, 2009). 
The couple’s cooking program was regarded by an executive of Oregon Public 
Broadcasting, one network that carried their show, as ‘“ahead of their time,’ relying on 
local produce and seeing cooking as a social activity” (Sarasohn, 2009). Their 
restaurant, for its part, featured an innovative menu and a seating arrangement that 
helped “turn dining into a spectator sport,” establishing the precedent for proximity 
between diner and chef seen in many Portland restaurants today (Sarasohn 2009). 
Pence’s vision of dining as a social event resonates with so-called “cartivores” 
(street food devotees) flocking to Portland food carts today. By their nature, food carts 
require patrons to gather in lines while food is prepared and crowd around their stoops 
while food is eaten. Often lacking private tables or personal bar stools, customers must 
instead stand on the street and wait for their meal, which “creates an opportunity to 
connect with other customers and passersby” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). As planner 
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William Whyte noted, this clustering contributes to the vibrancy of a city: ‘“what 
attracts people most in an urban place is other people”’ (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). And at 
the center of all this attention and social activity is the food cart. 
A final foundational figure in Portland’s culinary culture is Michael Hebberoy, 
who founded Clarklewis restaurant alongside his wife Naomi in 2004. That year, the 
eatery was famously awarded “Restaurant of the Year” by The Oregonian, despite 
being open for only four months and having yet to complete construction on its space 
(Donahue, 2006). The restaurant pioneered Portland’s farm-to-table movement, now a 
national dining phenomenon. From its inception, Clarklewis has followed a radical 
business model: its head chef “never knows what he’ll be preparing until farmers arrive 
at the restaurant with the cream of their crop. Meat is butchered on-site, and servers 
spend 30 minutes taste-testing food each day before they present it to customers” 
(Weinberger, 2005).  
As for its founder: “Hebberoy says his food philosophy is shaped by the [Do-It-
Yourself] arts movement” (Donahue 2006). Although Hebberoy split from his 
restaurant (and his wife) in 2006, the tradition of personal creation has since been 
continued in Portland by its food carts: “to those familiar with Portland, the 
preponderance of food carts makes a great deal of sense. Innovative local visionaries 
have long encouraged the city’s quirky independent culture and creative entrepreneurial 
spirit” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). Food carts perfectly represent the gastronomic 
expression of this independent culture and creative entrepreneurial spirit.  
Coupled with an emphasis on high quality yet economically accessible products, 
these cultural factors have combined to form a unique dining culture found almost 
nowhere else in the nation or even the world. But other than the fact that Portlanders 
like to eat, there are further elements that have contributed to the meteoric rise in the 
city’s food cart vendors over the past several years.  
Chief among these—especially during periods of economic recession—is the 
comparatively low unit price food cart menus afford. “Food carts allow those on a 
budget to continue to eat out economically” by offering prices consistently several 
dollars below restaurant listings (Chastain, 2010). Particularly for those intimately 
involved with local dining culture yet faced with shrinking disposable incomes as a 
 6  
result of recession, food carts offer consumers “delicious and innovative grub…at a 
fraction of what they would have had to pay in a restaurant” (Lewis 2011). 
Above and beyond the pleasure of eating a good meal for cheap, food carts offer 
certain cartivorous customers positive externalities1 in consumption. A “warm glow” 
from involving one’s self in food cart culture, supporting local innovation, culinary 
exploration, and entrepreneurial economic activity can be felt from eating at the carts. 
For food carts, this warm glow stems from the sense of accessibility and community 
experience street food offers consumers: “It doesn’t matter how refined your palate is or 
how much you make—anyone gets to enjoy, for a few minutes at least, the feeling of 
being part of a larger community” (Lewis, 2011). This sentiment is characterized by 
food cart eating tours organized by local companies meant to connect the city’s best 
food carts with their enthusiastic consumers.  
A final demand-side benefit of food cart dining is the advantage of “one-stop 
shopping” carts offer consumers. The clustering effects of many firms around the city 
have created cart pods, agglomerations of carts of all different types in central lots and 
parks. These pods collectively offer consumers an expanded menu beyond even what 
could be had at a restaurant, allowing individual consumers to suit specific preferences 
no matter their mood. Producer clustering encourages comparison-shopping, which 
attracts even more consumers. This in turn contributes to “the social aspect of food 
carts,” heightening the warm glow effects discussed above (Chastain, 2010). Clusters 
also add value to a food cart meal by providing basic dining accommodations such as 
tables, silverware, alcohol service, musical performances and entertainment, intra-diner 
interaction, and even fire pits and protection from the city’s often-wet weather. 
In all, Portland’s food carts have benefitted from a mix of cultural factors 
emphasizing high quality eating but frugal spending; individual entrepreneurship but 
community involvement. This mix has fueled demand for street food, and suppliers 
have responded. 
                                                        1 A benefit or cost imposed on society outside of the marketplace (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 
2005). 
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The Supply Curve 
My analysis of factors on the supply side integral to the rise of food carts in 
Portland begins (contrary to many theories of supply side economics) with the 
government. Primarily, weak government regulation and relatively scant bureaucratic 
intervention in—or even attention to—the market in general has allowed food carts to 
establish themselves on sidewalks across Portland. Due to a business classification 
technicality in the city’s legal code that files all street food vendors as mobile units, they 
are exempt from complying with formal building code requirements usually reserved 
for restaurants operating on private property (City of Portland, 2007). Technically, food 
carts exist as mobile vehicles, classified as hitch trailers rather than food service centers, 
thus voiding the applicability of most building code provisions.  
To address this gaping regulation void, the City of Portland’s Bureau of 
Development Services (BDS) has crafted an official policy action for food carts 
operating on private property in the city: ‘“ignore them’” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). Even 
former Portland mayor Sam Adams has acknowledged his office’s relatively laissez-
faire response to street food vending: ‘“we have worked really hard to stay the hell out 
of the way,”’ he told the Toronto Sun in an interview (Peat, 2013).  
Health code obligations, on the other hand, are still stringently applied to food 
carts. However, instead of seeking out restaurant spaces and equipment built 
specifically for food service operation, food cart owners and operators are left to mold 
the details of their production process to comply with established regulations. Such a 
system may require owners to cart their daily minimum 75 gallons of water for cooking 
cleaning to their cart by hand every day, for example, but these tradeoffs are implicit in 
the food cart model (Multnomah County Environmental Health Department, 2012).  
Although the County Health Department remains strict in its food service 
policies, it has little ability to actually control the operation of carts complying with its 
vending laws. This office is left to the Bureau of Development Services, which has 
added to the culture of regulatory indifference with its building code violation 
enforcement policy: “in most instances, the bureau begins investigating a code violation 
when a citizen reports a potential violation” (Portland BDS, 2014). In all, since 
voluntary reporting of violations is a prerequisite for regulatory action, and since food 
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carts are overwhelmingly well received with Portland citizens, significant regulation of 
any sort has been largely absent from the food cart market. 
Even if wary citizens did begin to raise issue with food cart operations, city 
planners have little incentive to restrict market functionality. “From an urban design 
perspective, food carts enrich the urban environment by increasing foot traffic, 
activating parking lots and streetscapes” (Chastain, 2010). This is a function unique to 
street vendors operating directly on sidewalks and between public spaces, in contrast to 
firms residing in buildings more removed from public lots and walkways. Property 
owners in the city—chief among them surface parking lot management companies—
have recognized the benefits of these street vendors operating on their land, and have 
encouraged food carts to set up shop as they please. One parking lot management 
company has calculated that a cart operating on its property “could generate about 50% 
more revenue than a parked car” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). Furthermore, empirical 
evidence from around the city points to enhanced economic activity centered upon food 
cart pods: “According to an Oregonian article, a business owner near a new cluster of 
food carts on Hawthorne Blvd. acknowledged that the carts have increased his 
business” (Kapell et al., 2010). 
One of the most important results of the City’s hands-off approach to regulation 
for the market as a whole is its effect on the costs associated with running a food cart. 
Free from building code regulation, cart owners are saved from the considerable initial 
capital investments in items such as large kitchen hoods, fire extinguisher systems, and 
stringent waste disposal infrastructure normally required to legally run a food service 
enterprise. As a result, fixed costs2 as well as sunk costs3 are reduced to levels 
appreciably lower than those seen in the restaurant industry. This makes opening a food 
cart ‘“a way of easing into being in business without too much financial risk,”’ as Addy 
Bittner, principal of Addy’s Sandwich Bar, explained (Rodgers & Roy, 2010).  
                                                        2 “The cost that does not vary with the quantity produced” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 3 “An expenditure that has already been made and cannot be recovered. Once the firm incurs 
this cost, it cannot be avoided by shutting down” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 
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Like fixed costs, small-scale food carts face dramatically reduced variable costs4 
across the board compared to restaurants. Retail rent is a prime example of this effect. 
Chastain (2010) estimates the average food cart pays around $2.50 per square foot in 
rent a month, in contrast to the $15-$50 per square foot monthly rent asked for 
restaurant spaces listed for lease on Portland’s retail Internet sites. Reduced spending on 
silverware, dishwashing, laundry, and raw food inputs are all additional tenets of the 
food cart business model. Furthermore, it is unnecessary for carts to hire the numerous 
employees indispensible to a full-service restaurant. Often, cart owners themselves are 
one of only two or three employees at a cart; it is also not uncommon for a cart to be 
operated completely by its owner.  
Such spare supervision has made operating a food cart a relatively simple, low-
risk, and inexpensive business venture. Yet food cart culture is attractive to suppliers for 
other reasons as well. For cooks, the opportunity to innovate freely as the sole master of 
a kitchen is an appealing proposition. And because food trucks operate on a smaller 
scale than do restaurants, their entrepreneurial operators have more time and money 
available to devote to crafting and honing new recipes, sourcing the best local 
ingredients, and establishing relationships with the farmers, butchers, and bakers that 
constitute their supply chain (Lewis, 2011). Moreover, by their very nature, carts solve 
one of the great dilemmas of restaurant cooking: “‘if you cook, you don’t get to interact 
with customers; if you work at the front, you don’t get to cook.” Cart chefs, conversely, 
experience both aspects of this tradeoff. In short, ‘“food carts are a cook’s dream’” 
(Rodgers & Roy, 2010). 
Behind the Curves 
Collectively, official indifference, attractive business incentives, and a 
distinctive culture of creativity and individualism define supply-side determinants of 
Portland’s food cart explosion. Suddenly, it seems, supply has met demand, and I have 
reached an equilibrium in my analysis of Portland’s food cart market.  
But it’s not always that straightforward. No market analysis would be complete 
without an investigation of the factors “behind the curves” of demand and supply; that                                                         4 “A cost that varies with the quantity produced” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 
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is, the economic climate in which market exchanges are conducted. For many industries 
evolving in the first two decades of the 21st century, it’s a cold world. Business cycle 
downturns and recent recession have devastated most market growth in the 2000’s. But 
bigger business busts have actually been a boon for Portland’s fledgling food cart 
industry. “Especially during the recession, the surge in new food carts over the past 
[five] years has provided a way for those who may have otherwise been unemployed to 
start a business or at least earn some income.” Food carts “can provide flexible jobs and 
entrepreneurial opportunities for people who want to set their own hours and agenda, 
with start-up and operating costs that are not too daunting” (Chastain, 2010).  
This is an especially enticing option for many of the unemployed chefs and 
kitchen staff, recent culinary school graduates, and small-scale entrepreneurs that 
comprise much of Portland’s corps of street food suppliers. For the same reason that 
low cost meals entice consumers, low cost business ventures attract suppliers in a period 
marked by reduced consumer spending and little economic growth. As a result of their 
low start-up and operating costs and opportunities for self-employment, “hundreds of 
immigrants, chefs, and first-time business owners have turned to food carts as 
recession-busting businesses” (Burningham, 2010). 
Overall, demand-side factors such as an appreciation of culinary quality, 
emphasis on individual entrepreneurship, and a sentiment of community involvement 
have mixed with loose regulation, strong business incentives, and ample opportunities 
for complete cooking freedom in the midst of an economic recession. The result is a 
market completely unique to Portland. “What makes Portland’s street food scene so 
distinctive—and appealing—is the way vendors continually push the genre’s traditional 
boundaries, to the point that entire food cart villages have laid down roots and offer 
increasingly sophisticated and varied cuisine” (Rodgers & Roy, 2010). Food carts have 
become completely embedded in the cultural and commercial fabric of the city itself, 
and in the process created a new gastronomic and economic paradigm for spending, 
eating, and living well. 
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Figures 
Thus far, I have taken a preliminary step in expanding the (growing) body of 
literature on street food with an investigation of the phenomenon of food carts in 
Portland. But I can go further. It’s obvious the market for street food is simmering with 
activity. But how exactly have Portland’s food carts grown up? Grounded by my new 
understanding of the foundational factors for food carts in Portland, I now illustrate how 
street food has progressed across the city over time. Through a series of geographic and 
numeric charts, I describe trends in Portland’s food cart market. Data for this 
investigation span a sample of over 700 food carts from 2006 to 2011, and were 
gathered from the Multnomah County Health Department as business license listings. In 
the course of this analysis, I will explore where food carts locate across the city, what 
exactly they produce, and how their numbers have grown over time. This will complete 
a basic depiction of the recent state of Portland’s street food market. 
Growth 
The logical starting point in my quest to describes patterns in Portland’s food 
cart market is its trend of growth over time. Figure 1 below plots this growth, revealing 
a fairly constant, linear growth progression from 2006 to 2011. Projections of market 
size only consider firms that have entered the market later than December of 2005; any 
food carts already operating prior to that date were not included in sample data charted 
below. Over the six years considered, almost 400 food carts joined the market and were 
still producing at the end of the sample. Nearly another 300 entered and exited in just 
over half a decade. While the extent to which the Portland’s street food market grew is 
remarkable, note that Figure 1 does indicate a sustained contraction in the rate of market 
growth in the middle of the sample, which corresponds to the height of an economic 
recession in late 2008 through 2009. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Further, Figure 2 displays market activity by monthly marginal changes in 
market size. Nearly all periods considered saw gains in numbers of suppliers—with the 
exception of late 2011, at which point comparatively many incumbent firms exited. 
However, by 2011, the market had grown considerably (as evidenced by Figure 1), and 
these contractions were quickly followed by further entry, and are inconsistent with an 
overall trend of expansion. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Geography 
Now that the size of Portland’s food cart market growth is clear, the next step is 
to examine its geographic shape. Figures 3 through 8 project annual maps of Portland 
overlaid with simple symbols representing individual food carts. The import of these 
images is in the time series they represent. Taken together, these figures illustrate not 
only the magnitude of Portland’s food cart market growth, but also the location of some 
of the city’s most popular points of production. These figures divulge the popularity of 
Portland’s central business district (located in the core of the city to the Southwest) 
amongst street vendors across virtually every year sampled. However, towards the end 
of the study, food carts can be seen spreading themselves almost everywhere in the city. 
 All maps are projected using the common North American Datum 1983 HARN 
geographic coordinate system to allow for easy manipulation of multiple datasets 
projected under several different systems. Street, river, and Metro area boundaries were 
sourced from Oregon Metro’s RLIS Live database, which was accessed through the 
University of Oregon’s data share initiative. Food cart data were geo-located with 
latitude and longitude points, then transformed into the NAD 1983 HARN. Metro’s 
RLIS layers were initially projected using a state plane system with units of distance in 
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feet, and thus required conversion into a coordinate system of decimal degrees to mesh 
with the food carts’ latitude-longitude delineation. This resulted in minor distortion of 
base layers, but given the relatively fine scale of these maps, distortions are by and large 
inconsequential.  
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
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Groups 
With an overview of magnitude and direction complete, I now examine certain 
intricacies of market activity. One relevant feature of Portland’s street food market is its 
cart pod clusters. Figures 9 through 14 illustrate changes in the characteristics of some 
of these pods over time. The first of these gives nominal counts of total firms entered 
into the market, broken out by numbers of isolated and clustered firms. Carts are 
considered clustered if they collocate alongside at least two other firms, while isolated 
carts are those that operate away from other firms. Figure 10 shows percentage changes 
in numbers of clustered and isolated carts over the years. Immediately obvious from 
these first figures is the dominance of clustering beginning in 2010. Interestingly, this 
coincides with the end of the period of decline in the rate of overall market growth 
discussed in Figure 1 above. One explanation of this phenomenon could be the 
saturation of the market beginning in 2010—with so many food carts already operating 
around the city, new entrants had no option but to locate near others in choice locations 
that previously might have been empty niches.  
Figure 11 illustrates total number of carts exited by clustered and isolated firm, 
and Figure 12 gives the ratio of clustered to isolated exitors over time. Contrasting 
trends in entry and exit, there is a lag between the dominance of clustered entrants and 
that of clustered exitors compared to isolated firms. Market entrants began to join pods 
in larger numbers than not at the beginning of 2010, but more firms do not begin to exit 
these clusters than isolated pods until much later in 2010 and into 2011. Additionally, 
the initial disparity between isolated and clustered exitors is much larger than for 
entrants, suggesting that, early in the sample, food carts in pods fared better than their 
isolated competitors. While both entry and exit rates increase exponentially over time, 
exit began to outpace entry towards the end of the sample. 
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Figure 12 
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Further, Figures 13 and 14 illustrate changes in size of some of Portland’s most 
popular pods in its Southwest and Southeast locations. Immediately obvious in these 
images is the degree to which central business district pods in the Southwest area are 
much larger than their counterparts located in residential and small-scale commercial 
neighborhoods in the Southeast. For example, Portland’s largest cart pod, on Alder 
Street in Southwest, held over 50 firms in 2011, while Good Food Here, the largest pod 
in the Southeast, reached 14 firms in 2011. This is below the average for all pods in 
Southwest. Figure 15 identifies the locations of these and other pods around the city.  
Figure 13 
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Figure 14 
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Goods 
Another angle from which to examine trends in market growth is by product 
type. The exact style of meal offered by a given food cart is an important aspect of its 
operation as a market agent. As such, Figure 15 divides market size over time by major 
food group offered. Figure 16 displays food types by percentage of the market held by 
producers of each type. American, Latin, and Asian meals are most popular among 
producers, although the numbers of food carts offering Latin meals declined 
significantly after 2009, while American and Asian producers expanded their rank after 
this period of recession. The exact definition of each product type and its implications 
for firm survival will be addressed in the formal discussion of the conceptual model 
used later in this study. 
Figure 16 
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Figure 17 
 
 
Economic Trends 
 Finally, in addition to firm movements, it is useful to understand trends in 
economic variables considered in the study period. The most interesting of these is the 
monthly unemployment rate for the Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), illustrated by Figure 17. As with trends in food cart market 
growth, unemployment rates experienced a significant shock in 2009. Other economic 
factors such as population and per capita personal income rates for the City of Portland 
remained relatively constant over the six years studied, and thus are not graphed.  
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Figure 18 
 
 
To this point, considerable gains towards the goal of complete comprehension of 
Portland’s street food market have been made. I have expounded the market’s origins, 
and described its size and shape. Yet there is still more to be done. Given the popularity 
of food carts among Portlanders and their ability to influence the development of the 
city’s holistic economic network, it is useful to understand the forces that dictate 
economic activity in the street food market. 
This process begins with a review of selections from prior economic literature 
regarding how firms and markets in general operate. After establishing a basic 
conception of market structure and performance, I further augment my study of 
Portland’s food carts with a survey of some of the specific features of that market itself.  
Literature 
 To effectively study any model of market organization, it is first necessary to 
understand what a market actually is. Broadly, a market is any arrangement that allows 
people to exchange things. Markets are delimited by two factors: their product and their 
geography (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). Depending on the good in question, different 
markets can have vastly different geographies. For street food meals, the product is 
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relatively widely defined, while the geography is relatively localized: although there are 
hundreds of different dining experiences offered by equally numerous food carts all 
over Portland, each cart has only one specific location in which its services can be 
contracted. As soon as a consumer purchases a meal, he consumes it, and cannot 
generally transfer it to another party or location. 
Microeconomics and Product Markets 
The specifics of market demand and supply are also largely variable—goods can 
be produced by anywhere from one to over one hundred suppliers in a single geographic 
region, and each type of market carries its own unique benefits and drawbacks for both 
producers and consumers. There are two theoretical arrangements relevant to my 
analysis of Portland’s food carts. The first of these is the most basic model of market 
organization: that of the perfectly competitive market. Perfect competition is 
characterized by supply from numerous small firms, all of which produce a relatively 
homogenous good. None of these firms are dominant enough to control the price of that 
good, and must instead accept the price determined by the mechanism of voluntary 
exchange on the market as its selling point. All of these firms, it is assumed, attempt to 
maximize their profits by varying the quantity of goods they produce (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus, 2005).  
In a competitive market, firms’ profitability and output decisions are ruled by 
their costs of production. Firms will find it in their best interests to operate in the short 
run as long as the price they receives for their goods is above the variable cost required 
for that firm to produce the good. Over long periods of time in the market, a competitive 
firm will only continue to produce if market price is at least equal to its average total 
cost of production (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005).  
However, perfect competition is rarely observed in real-world markets. More 
realistic is the model of imperfect competition, wherein individual firms are able, to a 
certain degree at least, to control the price of their goods. Economists denote this ability 
as a firm’s market power: the degree to which a firm is able to increase its price above 
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its marginal cost5 and thereby influence the price of goods on the market (O’Sullivan & 
Sheffrin, 2005). This power awards positive economic profits to firms that succeed in 
controlling their price. In imperfectly competitive markets, numerous firms produce, but 
goods can be differentiated, which is one way firms can control their price. Imperfect 
competitors may also garner market power through their internal economies of scale in 
production.6 Often, restaurant meals are used as a real-world example of an imperfectly 
competitive market (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). It stands to reason, therefore, that 
food carts may also follow imperfectly competitive trends, although I hypothesize food 
cart market patterns lean closer to perfect competition than do restaurants, as a result of 
cost structures previously discussed. 
These are two brief summaries of two broad types of economic markets 
necessary for the complete analysis of any market. But beyond typical structure, 
microeconomic theories also explain some of the specifics of how agents in these 
markets perform, relate, and produce. Generally, there are two ways by which to model 
how all market agents interact, each driven by a distinct set of underlying assumptions. 
The first of these, the neoclassical, is more or less straightforward. The second, of 
strategic interaction, can get complicated. It’s probably better to start simple. 
Neoclassical Organization 
Neoclassical models of industrial organization “emphasize that technological 
factors, such as economies of scale” determine entry and exit (Bresnahan & Reiss, 
1987). Under the neoclassical model, explaining how many firms exist in a market in 
the long run or how much market power is held by one firm over another is a matter of 
analyzing the degree to which expensive machinery or sophisticated technology are 
necessary inputs in a firm’s process of producing goods in that market. The more 
particular or costly production factors are, the more prohibitive entry is for new firms, 
and the more concentrated market power becomes in the hands of only a small number 
                                                        5 “The additional cost resulting from a small increase in some activity” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 
2005) 6 “A situation in which an increase in the quantity produced decreases the long run average cost 
of production” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005) 
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of large firms operating in the market at a given time (Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson, 
1988). 
This is because with technological and size advantages come reductions in 
average costs due to internal scale economies. Further, more technical firms can recover 
their fixed costs more quickly, providing incentive to remain in a market longer. Stigler 
(1968) sums up these gains as “cost advantages.” Importantly, a given firm only realizes 
its cost advantages in the long run (Carlton, 2005); that is, only after operating for 
several years7 and adjusting its production function to optimize performance can a firm 
truly establish economies of scale in production. 
Strategic Interaction 
 However, there is more to market organization than fundamental technological 
advantages. Especially given that firms can only truly capitalize upon their technical 
leads in the long run, immediate success in the market must be determined by other 
factors. Unfortunately for many producers, however, firms have relatively little control 
over their fates in the short and medium run. New entrants into any established market 
generally lack market power, and have no choice but to operate based upon untested 
production functions, founded only on their principals’ best estimations of what will 
lead to survival for a firm and what will not. More so than inherent cost advantages or 
actual observation and analysis of performance, expectations of profit (and loss) are the 
determining factor in decisions regarding production decisions in a market in the short 
run. 
Firms operating this way forecast their expected revenues and costs as a function 
of a bundle of characteristics describing the performance of their individual operation 
and the market in which it functions (Blonigen, Liebman & Wilson, 2013). These 
expectations are conditioned by the potential entrant’s knowledge that their predicted 
profits are dependent upon the entry and exit decisions of their competitors (Bresnahan 
& Reiss, 1990). Thus, the context for these strategic models is one of dynamic 
adjustments by firms over multiple periods of time: considering the actions and payoff                                                         7 Firms reach their long run state of production once they have had sufficient time in the market 
so as to be able to adjust any and all parts of their production function, should they see fit 
(O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 
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it expects for its competitors, each firm makes decisions to enter, produce, or exit each 
period based upon the payoff it expects from its actions (Bresnahan & Reiss, 1990). As 
stated by Moorthy (1985), “the essence of competition is interdependence. 
Interdependence means the consequences to a firm of taking action depends not just on 
that firm’s action, but also what actions its competitors take.” In this view of a market, 
firms can earn positive profits and develop market power not only by establishing 
prohibitive cost advantages, but also by strategically deciding how much of a good they 
will produce. 
To construct concrete models of strategic interaction between firms in a market, 
economists have started playing games. Beginning with von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), game theory has been used to model economic behavior as a “systematic way to 
understand the behavior of players in situations where their fortunes are interdependent” 
(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995). Strategic games can be assembled for and applied 
to almost any observable market structure. In models of exit, game theory is most often 
used to illustrate the actions of firms preparing to leave a declining industry. Osborne 
(2000) illustrates theoretically that in this type of market, larger firms with greater 
points of minimum efficient scale8 will exit first, while smaller firms will be able to 
survive in the market longer because losses incurred at low quantities produced are 
lower compared to their larger competitors.  
Complications and Simplifications 
Of course, a host of factors influence the strategic decisions made by firms in 
any game theoretical archetype, and attempting to model the interactions of agents in an 
economy can get complicated quickly. Errors in estimation of measured variables and 
inability to observe certain characteristics of individual decisions arise and increase 
exponentially as models become more sophisticated, as Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) 
note in their empirical investigation of qualitative-choice games.  
To simplify these intricate games, it is necessary to take a step back—way 
back—from the complex nature of market moves and view the market for what it is: a 
device for the exchange of one thing for another. In short run periods of exchange, firms                                                         8 The quantity of output at which economies of scale are exhausted (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 
2005) 
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compete with each other for profit based upon prices offered and quantities produced. 
Certain firms may earn positive profits based upon the structure of the market, while 
others may see negative returns. Depending on these profits or losses, some firms will 
be forced to exit the market, while others will continue to produce. Examining a market 
this way is useful. It affords the ability to capture the some of the complex determinants 
of market structure through our observation of entry or exit decisions. Dunne et al. 
(2009) take this approach, observing that, in the short run, factors such as product 
differentiation, geographic segmentation of markets, and the intensity of competition 
(among others) influence a given firm’s fortunes.  
Long run market structure can be simplified through a similar method. Again 
following Dunne et al. (2009), it is assumed that the number of firms in the market is 
determined endogenously by the collective entry or exit decisions made by the group of 
firms that constitute the market. Firms will enter if they expect profit in the long run, 
but will exit if their long run profits fall below zero (Blonigen, Liebman & Wilson, 
2013). Entry and exit decisions over time are observable, and provide a basis for 
interpretations of how a market works in both its short and long run periods. The key 
aspect of this type of market analysis is that, as Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) state, 
“these models presume that we do not observe entrants’ revenues or costs. Instead, we 
draw inferences about firms’ unobservable profits from threshold conditions that 
describe [firms’] strategies.” Therefore, based upon the strategic choices of firms in any 
given period of time in a market, it is possible to draw conclusions as to that firm’s long 
run expectations of profit or loss. 
Industrial Dynamics 
It is understood that firms operate on a dynamic, interactive basis. It follows that 
their markets are equally active. Indeed, “driven by environmental forces and 
innovation, industries evolve through prototypical phases of a lifecycle and undergo 
irreversible transformations in their competitive dynamics, organizational diversity, and 
structures” (Agarwal, Sarkar & Echambadi, 2002). The importance of this dynamism is 
tantamount to entry, exit, and survival. Immediately following the establishment of a 
product market, opportunities for profit are abundant, but uncertainty reigns supreme. 
All firms, as noted above, face untested production functions and unproven 
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technologies immediately following their entry. This uncertainty is heightened 
considerably for new firms in new markets; not only are their principals unsure of the 
specifics of their own production, but they lack the luxury of observing the experiences 
of similar firms, and have virtually no empirical basis for their business decisions. In 
this formative stage, production is limited to products of “relatively primitive design 
manufactured on relatively unspecialized machinery” (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001). 
But as the market develops, more profit-seeking firms enter, reducing the return to early 
innovation and forcing the refinement and standardization of the product; sustained 
periods of such entry saturates the market and diminishes many opportunities for short 
run profit (Mueller, 1972). Eventually, many incumbent firms exit as they exhaust all 
potential for profit from their activity in the market, and the market approaches its long 
run equilibrium number of firms and amount of profit. These final numbers are variable 
across markets, but generally, competitive markets are characterized by lots of firms 
and little profit; monopolistic or oligopolistic markets take the inverse. 
Agglomeration 
The above discussion presented general methods for thinking about and 
modeling the organization of almost any market for nearly any good. With these 
fundamentals informing further inquiry, I now turn to certain specific aspects of 
industrial structure pertinent to Portland’s food carts. 
The first of these food cart features has to do with the locational decisions of 
firms. When a new firm chooses to enter a market, it has two basic choices: it can locate 
in close proximity to other similar firms, or it can locate in an isolated niche. This is a 
substantial decision because of its implications for the firm’s ability to exploit certain 
scale economies. The economies of scale in production central to neoclassical models of 
market structure are completely internal to the firm; each producer can lower its 
production costs only as it increases output by improving its technology or expanding 
the size of its operation. However, there is another method by which to garner 
economies of scale in production: through the collaboration of multiple firms in the 
same market. While perhaps counterintuitive at first brush, the concept of several 
similar firms producing in the same market—competitors—allying parts of their 
production process is in fact such a key tenet of economic activity in any market that it 
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has been referred to as “the black box that justifies the very existence of cities” 
(Duranton & Puga, 2003).  
By joining a cluster, firms can take advantage of the beneficial forces that cause 
firms to agglomerate—agglomerative economies. These include labor market pooling 
and matching,9 intermediate input sharing,10 and knowledge spillovers,11 all of which 
contribute to increases in efficiency in production and therefore scale economies. 
However, physical presence in a cluster is vital for the exploitation of these advantages; 
any production gains to be had as a result of clustering are highly localized, fading after 
only a few miles or less (Rosenthal & Strange, 2001). Additionally, “there is evidence 
that knowledge spillovers are more important for industries with small, competitive 
firms” (O’Sullivan, 2009). Street food in Portland is a perfect example of this type of 
market. 
Yet agglomeration is by no means a guarantor of economic profit. O’Sullivan 
(2009) demonstrates theoretically that, as the number of firms in a cluster increases, 
average profits of firms across the cluster at first rapidly increase, then decrease 
exponentially. This is a result of the nature of firms’ total cost function, which is shown 
to first decrease as the number of agglomerated firms increases, but then increase 
rapidly. The increase in total costs is the consequence of increased labor costs for firms 
in very large clusters, which are a driven by greater competition for skilled labor among 
clustered firms. It seems, therefore, that too much of a good thing can force firms to fail. 
Location 
 Besides the bivariate option of agglomeration or isolation, locational decisions 
have another, more varied dimension. Firms can also elect where within a geographic 
market they choose to operate. This decision is motivated by the collection of attributes 
a specific location can potentially proffer producers. The advantages of one site’s                                                         9 Agglomerations facilitate more efficient exchange of skilled workers between firms in a 
cluster (O’Sullivan, 2009). 10 Intermediate inputs are goods one firm produces that another uses as an input in the 
production of another good, such as a button-making machine used by a dressmaking firm. 
Dividing the cost of a button-making machine among several small firms in a cluster can 
significantly reduce average costs for all firms (O’Sullivan, 2009). 11 “Sharing knowledge [about production techniques and market characteristics] among firms in 
an industry” (O’Sullivan, 2009). 
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characteristics to a firm are themselves dependent upon the characteristics of the firm 
itself, and logically, firms will attempt to locate where they expect profits to be 
maximized (Carlton, 1983). The characteristics at issue here are the nature of a firm’s 
production process and the structure of its total cost function.  
Connor and Schiek (1997) use the food manufacturing industry to identify firms 
of three unique cost structures that affect positional decisions. The first of these are 
supply-oriented firms, for which the most costly aspect of production is the 
procurement of intermediate goods. For these firms, fresh fruits and vegetables, meats, 
or seafood capture the majority share of production costs. Once these inputs are 
obtained, however, production is relatively simple and costless. A second category of 
cost structure is that of the demand-oriented firm. Here, actual production and 
distribution of products dominates production costs, while raw input costs are relatively 
reduced. For food carts, this type of firm is one that prepares elaborate meals with many 
ingredients and complex production processes. Finally, footloose firms are dominated 
by neither input nor manufacturing costs, but strike a balance between the two.  
Supply-oriented firms have been found to favor locations near their input 
suppliers and sources of low-cost labor, while demand-oriented firms tend to locate near 
demand markets and transportation systems. Footloose firms, unsurprisingly, are 
indifferent between locations (Henderson & McNamara, 2000). Generally, access to 
existing transportation, infrastructure, and labor and demand markets have been found 
to influence firm location decisions within a market; various firms require varying 
proximities to each of these amenities (Vesecky & Lins, 1995). 
Product Differentiation 
 A final important factor in Portland’s food cart market is the differentiation of 
its product into discrete, recognizable types of goods, if not even individual brands. In 
effect, this makes each firm a monopolist or oligopolist in the production of a specific 
type of good (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). As Smith (1956) explains, this is a 
significant power; it encourages consumers to develop loyalties to certain brands or 
categories of goods that they will—on average—purchase over other goods. Loyalty 
from consumers allows firms to mark up prices above what would be offered if all 
products were homogenous. If all goods produced were identical, consumers would 
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have no preference between brands and simply purchase the cheapest version of the 
good they could find. However, when products become differentiated, consumers 
become willing to pay more than the homogenous-good price as a result of their affinity 
to a certain brand (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). With marked-up prices come nonzero 
profits and a degree of market power; with market power comes an increased chance of 
survival in a market (Shaked & Sutton, 1982).  
Empirically, Rosen (1974) determines product differentiation is an important 
element of market price in competitive markets, while Stavins (1995) finds 
heterogeneity between firms and their products to be an important determinant of exit 
for firms producing different models of the same good. Finally, Chatterjee & Cooper 
(1993) prove product differentiation intensifies competition for accumulated capital 
among firms in markets responsive to exit and entry. 
The implications for agents on both sides of markets in which products are 
differentiated can be modeled in various ways; perhaps the most common of these are 
linear models of aggregate demand for differentiated products. Under the Bowley 
model, for example, the number of varieties of product offered in the market increases 
as a function of the number of firms in a market, which in turn causes overall consumer 
surplus12 to increase as the market grows (Martin, 2002). While estimation of a model 
of this type depends upon the (infeasible) observation of market prices and quantities 
sold, its basic tenements prove a useful guide to understanding the structure of a market 
with many firms and many product varieties. 
Intermission 
  Thus far, I have investigated the origins of supply and demand in Portland’s 
vibrant street food market, described trends in that market, and studied economic 
theories of industrial organization. I am now in a position to apply this newfound 
knowledge of industrial economics to food carts in Portland. To this end, I’ll turn to the 
process of econometrics.  
                                                        12 “The difference between a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product and the price he or 
she pays for the product” (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 
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empirics 
Descriptive statistics of structure and theoretical explanations of growth are 
informative and essential to the complete comprehension of any market. However, the 
performance of firms in a market can only truly be understood by direct empirical 
observation of their functionality. Therefore, heuristic inspection and analysis is the 
only way to absolutely determine which factors influence individual firm outcomes and 
the effect of these elements on those firms.  
For Portland food carts, such an analysis begins with a seemingly simple query: 
can I determine what makes for a successful food cart? To answer this question, I will 
let the carts speak for themselves. I use firm-level data gathered from the Multnomah 
County Health Department to predict how these carts perform as agents of economic 
production over their time in the market. Specifically, I will estimate the probability that 
a given food cart will exit the market over a period of six years between 2006 and 2011. 
The results of this econometric estimation process will yield insights into the complex 
and dynamic relationships between food carts, their customers, and their city.  
 To accomplish this evaluation, I will operate in three discrete, though again 
related, stages. First, I develop conceptual and empirical models of exit from Portland’s 
food cart market. This will define the relationships between individual firms’ market 
outcomes and the factors that predict their survival. Second, I estimate the effect of 
various firm and industry characteristics on food cart exit outcomes. Finally, I interpret 
these estimations to reach conclusions regarding the factors that encourage certain food 
carts to survive while others fail. 
Conceptual Model 
 The model presented in the following section is derived in large part from my 
prior theoretical research into urban and industrial economics and my historical study of 
Portland’s food carts. It is well established by previous investigations that the survival 
of a given firm in a certain market is dependent upon a bundle of characteristics 
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describing both the firm and the market. Furthermore, prior studies have found several 
different methods of varying complexity by which to model the effects of these 
characteristics on firm exit, entry, and survival decisions, as discussed previously.  
These models all begin with the same grounding assumption: that firms act 
rationally—that is, logically consider the costs and benefits of their actions—when 
making decisions regarding their participation in a market. From this assumption, it 
follows that a firm will exit if and when it is no longer profitable to operate in the 
market, or when its principals realize it will never become profitable.  
This is the basis of the food cart survival model. I know firms will exit if they 
are not profitable, and thus can craft a set of hypotheses regarding what contributes to a 
firm’s profitability (or lack thereof). That is, I will create a version of reality that I think 
best explains actual profitability of Portland’s food carts. In my model, I’ll say that a 
firm’s location, agglomeration, and product type decisions matter for its ability to avoid 
exit. So does its lifespan in the market. Information about the market as a whole, such 
as how many people can feasibly buy food from street vendors, how much money those 
people have, and how many of those people have jobs, also matters.  
The profitability of a given Portland food cart at a certain point in time can be 
formally expressed by Equation 1, derived from Blonigen, Liebman & Wilson (2013): 
Equation 1 
𝜋𝑓𝑚𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑓𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓𝑚𝑡 
 Here, 𝜋 represents the long run profits of a food cart. These profits are not 
observed, but if a firm exits the market, it is assumed they have fallen below zero. 
Importantly, the period in which a firm exits is observable. Since I assume its owners 
act rationally, I can say this is also the point at which that firm has earned negative 
economic profit. In this model, 𝑥 represents a matrix of variables that explain the firm’s 
long run profits. The bundle of deterministic factors described by 𝑥 can be broken down 
into an index of individual firm characteristics (𝑓) and an index of market 
characteristics (𝑚). The estimation coefficient (𝛽) on the matrix of explanatory 
variables will be calculated from data inputted into the model, and will convey 
information regarding the effect of changes in the deterministic components on the long 
run profits of a given food cart. Equation 1 also includes a stochastic piece (𝜀) that 
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captures errors in explaining the true nature of the observed relationship between profits 
and the deterministic matrix with an estimated model. Importantly, all variables in this 
model contain a time component (𝑡), allowing for estimation of this model in any given 
time period. 
 Considering this definition of a firm’s profits, and with the understanding that 
firms will exit the market in the period in which they cannot operate as profitable 
enterprises, I can express exit as a probability. In any given period for which a firm 
operates in the market, there is a chance that it will be forced to exit because it does not 
earn enough profit to justify remaining in the market. As such, the probability that a 
firm will exit the market in a given period can be modeled as follows: 
Equation 2 Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝑓𝑚𝑡 = Pr(𝛽𝑥𝑓𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓𝑚𝑡 < 0) 
Equation 2 represents exit probability as conditional upon pre-exit characteristics of the 
firm and geographic market. The dependent variable (Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝑓𝑚𝑡) is binary, taking a 
value of one if a given firm exits the market in any period considered in the sample, and 
zero if the firm remains in the market for the duration of the sample (until at least 
January 2012). When the model is estimated, predicted probabilities will fall along a 
range between zero and one. Yet before estimating this model and determining how 
variables indices influence the probability of exit from this market, it is useful to 
understand the composition of these indices of explanatory variables, thus far 
characterized only by 𝑥.  
Firm-Level Index 
 The first catalog of explanatory variable that affects firm survival in Portland’s 
food cart market is that most directly related to the functionality of the firm itself. These 
variables can be expressed as a function of 𝑍, which will serve as a representative for all 
explanatory variables expounded in this section: 
Equation 3 
𝑍 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛2 + 𝜀 
From Equation 3, it can be seen that three discrete firm characteristics influence the 
probability of exit. The former two of these pertain to the locational decisions of a firm. 
The first, 𝑃𝑜𝑑, is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm has chosen to 
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locate itself within a cluster as opposed to locating isolated from other firms. The 
features and advantages to firms of these pods have been discussed previously. It is 
assumed food cart principals are fully aware of the payoffs to their enterprises from 
locating within a pod, and rationally weigh those benefits against the costs of locating 
within a pod. Implicit in this locational analysis is the comparison between expected 
benefits of locating within a pod and the benefits a given cart might receive from 
isolation the cart foregoes when it elects to locate in a pod. 
 Similarly, carts can consciously choose a certain location within the geographic 
market itself for their operation, represented by 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 above. To capture these 
geographic considerations, the City of Portland can be divided into five discrete 
regions,13 into one of which a given food cart may place itself upon entry. Each region 
may provide certain benefits to a food cart operating within its borders. For example, 
carts located in the Southwest portion of the city can exploit potentially high demand 
from consumers for quick, low-price food cart meals in the central business district and 
its high concentration of other firms and laborers. Alternatively, food carts operating in 
primarily residential neighborhoods in the Northeast region of the city may take 
advantage of potential demand for food cart services from families consistently seeking 
high quality yet inexpensive meals for an entire household. Geographic regions are 
rounded out by the upscale mixed-use district in the Northwest, residential and 
commercial areas in the Southeast, and big-box retail, industrial, and comparatively 
low-end residential areas in the North part of the city.   
Each geographic region presents unique benefits and costs for food carts, such 
as land rental rates, other variable production costs, and differences in consumer 
preferences. These costs and benefits are by no means unilateral for all food carts, but 
vary based upon individual carts’ production processes and the nature of their business, 
as illustrated by Carlton (1983). Certain carts may also choose not to define a specific 
location for themselves, but rather remain mobile and travel to different regions of the 
city by the day or week, thus attempting to capture demand from all across the city. In 
the estimation of the 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 variable, each region is assigned a discrete indicator,                                                         13 Refer to Figure 15 on page 26 for an illustration of these regions. 
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each of which will reveal the effect of locating within that specific region on the 
probability that a firm will exit the market. 
Another determinant held within the index of firm variables is 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, which 
indicates the product variety offered by a given food cart. Although its product—food—
defines Portland’s food cart market, actual services offered by carts across the city are 
quite heterogeneous. As previously discussed, Portland food carts are, at least in part, 
popular for their ability to satisfy a wide range of consumer preferences across a variety 
of service levels. Product differentiation is also a potential avenue to market power, 
making the type of good offered by each cart important for its ultimate success. 
Moreover, Portland’s food cart market is one characterized by many firms, and is thus 
responsive to exit and entry decisions (Dunne et al., 2009). Following Chatterjee & 
Cooper (1993), this indicates that differentiation of products is an avenue by which to 
earn positive profits. As such, it is hypothesized that product type is an important 
determinant of a firm’s ability to survive without exiting the market in the long run. 
However, many singular food carts lack the ability to establish significant 
individualized brand loyalties for themselves. Instead, they may only differentiate 
simply; that is, firms differentiate their products into broad varietal cohorts rather than 
specific brands. This affords carts some amount of inimitability compared to others, 
while simultaneously allowing firms of parallel types to free-ride on the reputations of 
those similar to themselves. Thus, several different food carts can generally meet 
consumer preferences or loyalties for certain product varieties through their 
differentiated products without necessarily establishing themselves as the sole producer 
of a single product type. Each product type subset may carry its own implications for 
the survival rates of producers of that specific type. 
More than any other, Portland’s carts serve “American” food: familiar 
sandwiches, hamburgers, barbeque, hot dogs, cheesesteaks, and related plates. Similarly 
numerous among food cart producers are those serving dishes categorized as “Asian.” 
These include Japanese bento boxes and Korean bibimbap, Thai phad ki mao and Indian 
curry, and other analogous dishes. Also represented by the 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 variable are “Latin” 
producers serving food with Central and South American origins; “Mediterranean” carts 
with offerings from Greece, Turkey, North Africa, and the Middle East; “Italian” carts 
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that produce plates of pasta and pizza; and “Dessert” carts supplying ice creams, baked 
sweets, and both sweet and savory crepes and waffles. Regression estimation 
coefficients will indicate which of these food types fare the best with consumers, and to 
what degree Portland’s eaters can influence the survival of a firm in the market based 
upon its product type. 
One final variable included in the firm-level index is that which measures the 
length of time (in months) a given firm has existed in the street food market. The 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 measure is expected to inversely influence the probability a given firm exits 
the market in a given period. That is, the longer a firm exists in the market, the lower 
the predicted probability of exit is expected to be. For food carts in Portland, this is not 
an unreasonable assumption. Producers with longer market lifespans are those that have 
proven their product is desirable and their production function is effective. For these 
firms, longer lifespan means more time to command market power and avoid shutdown. 
Therefore, longer lifespan means more opportunities for profit, and reduced probability 
of exit.  
An interaction of this variable is also included to capture any non-linearity in the 
effect of firm lifespan on exit probability. Positive regression coefficients on 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛2 
will indicate an increase in the rate of change in the effect of 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 on exit 
probability, while a negative coefficient denotes a decrease in the rate of change in 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 on exit probability over time. 
Market-Level Index 
 Beyond the individual firm, there are other, larger factors that affect the 
probability a food cart will exit in a given period as well. Appending these to Equation 
3 gives us:  
Equation 4 
𝑍 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛2+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀 
Where 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 measures the population of Multnomah County, the administrative 
boundary that encompasses the majority of the greater Portland metropolitan area, 
including the center of the city itself. The 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 variable has been restricted to 
the confines of Multnomah County because this boundary defines the limit of data for 
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this study; all food carts analyzed are located exclusively within Multnomah County. 
Firms operating outside of the county are not required to register themselves with 
Multnomah County officials, and are thus absent from the dataset. Regardless, 
Multnomah’s county lines serve as effective representatives for the City of Portland 
alone, excluding its suburbs. This is advantageous because it allows for the segregation 
of the distinct geographic markets of city and suburbs. Measuring the population of a 
metro area not only tests the effect of a city’s size on the mortality of its firms, but also 
serves as something of a controlling trend variable that can capture changes in general 
socioeconomic conditions over time, thereby making it a desirable independent variable 
in an industrial investigation such as this. 
Another variable measure of more macroeconomic market forces is average per 
capita personal income (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) earned by residents of the Portland metropolitan area. 
Just as the number of people living in the area able to purchase food cart meals 
influences firms’ profitability, so too does the amount of money those potential 
consumers have. Per capita personal income is a meaningful indicator of the average 
individual’s ability to purchase goods and services such as meals from food carts on the 
open market. The more personal income is earned, the easier it is for consumers to buy 
food from the carts.  
However, the service offered by carts may be somewhat unique. It is 
hypothesized that food cart meals are what economists categorize as an inferior good: 
one for which consumers’ demand decreases as their income increases. Street food fits 
with this pattern; more affluent eaters will generally elect to dine in more costly full-
service restaurants, where indoor seating, table service, and silverware are the norm. 
Consumers with less personal income to spend on food, conversely, will seek to avoid 
elevated costs and longer wait times associated with dining in restaurants and tend to 
frequent food carts for their fill instead.  
To further test this hypothesis, per capita personal income has been deflated 
(adjusted for inflation to ensure a consistent measurements of dollar values over time) 
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using a Consumer Price Index14 for spending on all food items excluding food at home. 
The polarity of the regression estimation coefficient on the 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 variable will 
indicate whether food cart meals can in fact be treated as an inferior good. The 
magnitude of the marginal effect of this coefficient will indicate the degree to which 
changes in exit probabilities respond to changes in the per capita personal income of 
Portland area residents—the income elasticity of demand for food cart meals. 
The final economic variable indexed by 𝑍 is a measurement of the monthly 
unemployment rate for workers in the labor force in the Portland metropolitan statistical 
area (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡). It follows from the previous discussion regarding the 
attractiveness of food carts as business options during periods of economic recession 
that unemployment rate—one measure of the impact of the severity of a business cycle 
fluctuation in an economic system—could affect the probability that a food cart exits 
the market. A general positive relationship between high unemployment rates and the 
numbers of producers operating in the food cart market has been observed; including 
this deterministic variable in an estimated model may establish causality between the 
two measures. Assuming that high unemployment causes growth in Portland’s food cart 
market, we would expect a positive relationship between unemployment and the 
probability of exit: as unemployment rises, more entrepreneurs open new food carts, 
intensifying competition and reducing market power, thus increasing the probability 
that a firm is unable to earn non-negative economic profit, and so chooses to exit. 
Methods 
 To this point, regressions and estimations have been bandied about as the 
ultimate solutions to my questions regarding the determinants of market performance by 
Portland food carts. Yet these perhaps mysterious processes beg clarification if I am to 
meaningfully interpret their outputs. Generally, regressions seek to identify 
relationships between one dependent variable and a multitude of independent variables, 
and rely upon observations of each to work. I do not expect to uncover a perfect                                                         14 The calculated index of average prices of a predetermined basket of goods consumed over 
time (Blanchard, 2006). 
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relationship between the two sets, but rather attempt to maximize the amount of changes 
in the dependent variable I can statistically explain with changes in the independent 
variables used in the regression model (Dougherty, 2011). In this way, a regression 
takes observed sample characteristics and models actual relationships between 
regressors and the dependent variable for an entire population of subjects. The result is 
reliable estimates of the true value of a dependent variable for any specified level of a 
given independent variable (holding all other independent variables constant). 
 In order to properly estimate a binary model of food cart exit, it is assumed that 
cart exit data are shaped following a cumulative standardized normal distribution, such 
that the probability of an event such as exit occurring at any period of time can be 
defined as a function of 𝑍𝑡. I can substitute for 𝑍𝑡 to reach: 
Equation 5 Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡2 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝑡) 
Equation 5 above is the final model estimated in this study. When a regression of this 
equation is run, I assume the form of the error term is such that it is possible to estimate 
model parameters with a probit model via maximum likelihood estimation, following 
Blonigen, Liebman & Wilson (2013). This requires an iterative process to estimate 
parameters. To understand and interpret parameter estimates, for their part, also requires 
special care.  
Because exit probabilities are assumed to follow a normal distribution, the effect 
of each independent variable on the dependent variable changes with the value of 𝑍. As 
a consequence, regression coefficients do not immediately correspond to marginal 
effects of one explanatory variable on the dependent variable, ceteris paribus 
(Dougherty, 2011). Coefficient estimates are useful only for their general indications of 
the polarity and magnitude of each determinant on exit probability. However, in order 
to establish the amount of change in the dependent variable caused by a unit increase in 
a given explanatory factor, marginal effects must be calculated separately through a 
series of partial derivatives. The output of these calculations varies significantly 
depending upon the exact specifications of inputted variable measures.  
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Marginal effects presented in this study are calculated two different ways. In 
order to get a sense of overall the marginal effect of a model parameter on exit 
probability, average marginal effects (AME’s) are reported for each deterministic 
variable. These indicate, on average, the marginal effect of each independent variable 
on the outcome variable, holding all other independent variables fixed. For a given level 
of explanatory variable, the AME calculation yields an exit probability. This process is 
repeated for all increments of the same explanatory variable, at which point differences 
in probabilities across all levels of explanatory variable are averaged, producing an 
average marginal effect. Effectively, this process compares several discrete hypothetical 
populations, each with identical characteristics save for a given value of one 
deterministic variable. This process is desirable in regression models with several 
categorical indicator variables such as mine, as comparable groups are easily delineated 
based upon discrete categorical changes from zero to one, holding all else constant 
(Williams, 2011).  
However, marginal effects do not remain constant across all values of other 
deterministic variables, and forcing the characteristics of one sample subset onto 
another may not be entirely realistic. As such, marginal effects at representative values 
(MER’s) are also calculated. Using MER’s, it is possible to specify a range of values for 
one or more explanatory variable, and thereby identify changes in marginal effects of 
another determinant across that range. This is especially useful in a time series 
investigation, where marginal effects of certain determinants may vary over periods of 
time or throughout the lifespan of a firm in the market. 
Data 
 Data analyzed by the model of exit probability were collected from the 
Multnomah County Health Department as operational permits. Initial data contained 
listings for more than 800 uniquely identified food carts operating within Multnomah 
County between 2006 and 2011. Before entering the market, each firm is required by 
county regulation to pass a preliminary health code inspection conducted by the 
Multnomah County Health Department and register with its Bureau of Inspection and 
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Licensing. Firms are further mandated to renew their business license annually, and, in 
the event they exit the market, must notify the Health Department so as to avoid 
penalties for operating without a license (City of Portland, 2009).  
Data on period of entry and exit were gathered from these Health Department 
regulation records. These data were augmented with location information for carts listed 
in the Health Department registry gathered from numerous sources. Chief among these 
are Internet sites detailing Portland food cart locations, such as foodcartsportland.com, 
which records both historic and current locations of firms across the city. 
Approximately 50% of all location observations were gathered from 
foodcartsportland.com. Additional location data were gathered from select food carts 
themselves, by way of firm website site searches and telephone and personal interviews 
(30% of all location data). Finally, websites fueled by user-generated content such as 
yelp.com and urbanspoon.com (approximately 20% of all location observations) also 
proved relevant in supplying positional information, although data from these sources 
were considered less robust than the previous methods. Where applicable, firm location 
was verified by firsthand observation. 
Product type data was collected by the same method as that used for locational 
information. However, external sources and sampling were only minimally necessary 
for food type information. For the majority of carts in the sample, food type is reflected 
by firm name. For instance, a cart operating under the name “Fat Kitty Falafel” is 
expected to serve falafel and other Mediterranean foods; one called “Mr. Oink’s BBQ 
Express” is expected to supply barbequed meats in American-style sandwiches. While it 
is possible that inferences such as these are inaccurate, it is much more likely they are 
reliable because firms have incentive to honestly convey their product type through 
their name. In order to communicate accurate information regarding the exact nature of 
their service to consumers, a cart’s name must reflect its product. Because food carts are 
small firms that operate in a crowded, constantly changing market, many do not have 
the luxury of establishing definite associations between their names and their products. 
Thus, it is necessary to convey product type information through the firm name. 
Inaccurate or incomplete information resulting from a firm’s failure to identify itself 
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may prohibit consumers from identifying and purchasing the type of good offered by 
that food cart, thus costing the firm revenues.  
Appended to this information on individual food carts is data from the United 
States Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for population, income, and unemployment 
levels. Population information for Multnomah County residents were obtained by the 
BEA from the US Census Bureau’s annual population estimates series. Per capita 
personal income data were also measured annually, using Census Bureau midyear 
population estimates. Additional data on Consumer Price Indices were collected from 
the BLS as well. The specific CPI series used to deflate personal income was for all 
urban consumers in West region cities of between 50,000 and 1,500,000 residents; the 
basket of goods used was “food away from home”, or the value of all meals (including 
tips) purchased from any type of food vendor or caterer. 
Unemployment data were gathered using the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s 
ALFRED database, and are sourced from the BLS Metropolitan Area Employment and 
Unemployment series. Unemployment levels are measured monthly for the entirety of 
the Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro MSA. Unemployment rates throughout the larger 
Portland MSA are related to economic activity within the city itself. Moreover, 
unemployed workers living outside of Multnomah County may elect to enter the food 
cart market within the county rather than in the suburbs. Indeed, 116 total carts were 
registered within Multnomah County by principals with listed billing addresses in three 
of Portland’s largest suburbs over the six years included in the sample. Like 
unemployment rates, per capita personal income was measured for all Portland-
Vancouver-Hillsboro MSA residents. 
Characteristics and Concerns 
 The dataset considered in this study consists of observations for 706 firms over a 
span of six years. The objective is to use this sample of food carts to estimate 
relationships between variables that I think to be true of the entire population as well. 
Results achieved following this process are, at best, informed inferences regarding the 
true nature of food cart market operation. That said, statistical rigor is the order of the 
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day when it comes to establishing the validity of estimation models, and there are a 
variety of methods by which to assess the performance of a regression model. 
Although it is difficult to truly evaluate maximum likelihood estimations, the 
model estimated using this data faired well. If I were to take all model results for 
predicted probabilities above 0.5 (a 50% chance of exit) as true instances of exit, the 
regression model correctly predicted over 95% of all exit outcomes, incorrectly 
interpreting results for only 34 out of 706 food carts. Moreover, the Pseudo R2 measure 
of fit for the regression model indicated almost 67% of all variance in exit probability 
explained by the model. To further substantiate the model as a whole, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test (using 10 quantiles of estimated probabilities) was 
preformed; results indicated valid parameter estimates up to the 99% level of 
confidence. That is, there is less than a 1% chance that any given outcome as extreme as 
that generated by the regression model could occur by random chance. Finally, 
regression results do not report any instances of complete failure to determine an exit 
outcome, and coefficient estimates returned overwhelmingly statistically significant 
parameter estimates and marginal effects. While these latter measures are at best 
approximations of fit, taken together, they present a compelling case for a solid 
regression model that interprets relationships between parameters relatively close to 
their true values. 
However, as with any empirical analysis, there are limits to this investigation. It 
is immediately obvious from inspection of illustrations (such as Figure 19 below) of 
predicted exit probability that there is a high degree of variation in exit outcomes. Large 
variance indicates random noise in a sample, which hampers the effectiveness of 
estimators. A potential source of this noise, and an area of concern for the dataset as a 
whole, is measurement error.  
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Figure 19 
 
Chief among areas for potential measurement error are location data points 
gathered from external sources. Portland’s street food market, as has been noted, is one 
marked by constant dynamism on the part of its suppliers. Food carts can change 
locations or even operate without a fixed location, and consequently, it can be hard to 
definitely locate a specific cart. Over 100 firms listed in the initial Multnomah County 
Health Department Register of street food vendors were excluded from this analysis as 
a result of missing, incomplete, or conflicting location information. For the remaining 
firms for which locational information was obtained, there remains a certain probability 
that listed addresses—especially those found on yelp.com or urbanspoon.com—are 
inaccurate. However, in cases of uncertainty, observations were omitted so as to 
maximize the validity of regression estimates. 
Another potential root of measurement error is in the 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 variable. For 
those firms that entered the market towards the end of the sample (starting in 2011, for 
instance), measured market lifespan was sometimes artificially short, as I could not 
observe exit for all of these firms. As a result, although these firms do not exit, they 
have been in the market for sometimes as little as two months. This gives an incomplete 
representation of the true nature of these firms’ characteristics, which could bias sample 
estimates. However, significant structural differences between this group of firms and 
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the sample as a whole were not identified by a Chow test, validating their inclusion in 
the model. 
Overall, while measurement error may affect the ability of the econometric 
model to accurately describe the relationships between dependent and deterministic 
variables, there is reason to believe estimates from this model are valid. Coefficient 
estimates are overwhelmingly statistically significant, predicted instances of exit 
differed from actual observations by only 4.8%, and a relatively high Pseudo R2 indicate 
meaningful estimates for each measure. While it is difficult to isolate actual bias 
resulting from measurement errors, I am confident enough in my empirical results to 
regard any measurement bias as negligible and proceed with the regression models 
specified as legitimate estimates of true parameters. 
Results  
Presented in Table 1 are the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of a 
probit model of exit occurrences among a sample of Portland food carts. Both 
regression coefficients and average marginal effects are presented. For the categorical 
indicator variables of location and product type, only statistically significant estimates 
are displayed. Estimates for each variable are displayed above their standard errors, 
with significance levels represented as stars on coefficients. Results and implications of 
each component of this model will be addressed individually. 
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Table 1 
Exit Probability Model Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Estimate Marginal Effect Mean Impact on Exit Probability Pod 0.254 (0.175) 0.035 0.618 (0.023) Location: Northeast 0.610** (0.244) 0.097** 0.085 (0.042) Location: Southeast -0.382** (0.177) -0.052** 0.323 (0.023) Type: American 0.333** (0.166) 0.048** 0.385 (0.024) Type: Asian -0.583** (0.238) -0.076** 0.183 (0.028) Lifespan -0.326*** (0.0318) -0.041*** 21.14 (0.002) Lifespan2 9.62x10-4*** (2.93x10-4) - 855.6 Population -1.88x10-4*** (1.74x10-5) -2.64x10-5*** 2.2x106 (1x10-4) Personal Income 0.00250*** (3.83x10-4) 3.52x10-4*** 39,635.6 (1.4x10-4) Unemployment 1.040*** (0.130) 0.146*** 8.633 (0.0457) Constant 312.5*** (25.83) - - Observations Pseudo R2 Complete Successes Complete Failures 
706 0.633 60 0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results and Implications 
Outputs outlaid and minutiae behind me, I can turn to relevant regression 
estimation results regarding the performance of firms in the market for street food in 
Portland. The first step in this process is to interpret what these model outputs say about 
the characteristics of survival for Portland’s food carts. There is power in the numbers 
reported by this model, as each implies a specific conclusion regarding the relationship 
between a given determinant and its outcome. Furthermore, my understanding of 
regression model outputs is conditioned by my understanding of economic theory, and 
fundamental economic principles can be used to explain observed phenomena in 
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Portland’s street food market. With regression model outputs, I will be able to see how 
closely Portland food carts follow theoretical trends. More importantly, however, I will 
also be able to test the inverse: how applicable these theories are in real-world markets. 
Above and beyond the prime directive of complete comprehension of Portland’s food 
carts, this analysis allows me to evaluate the performance of economic models in actual 
situations. 
Agglomeration 
Locational decisions and their implications for firm survival is the first factor of 
food cart functionality to consider. From the first variable (𝑃𝑜𝑑) presented above, it is 
clear that clustering has no statistically significant effect on a given firm’s exit 
probability. That is, I cannot say a firm’s chances of surviving for the entirety of its time 
in the market throughout the study period are significantly influenced by its decision to 
join a cluster of other carts. This means, on average, Portland’s food cart pods do not 
offer benefits substantial enough to appreciably improve the survivability of individual 
carts located within clusters. This is perhaps not a surprise, given the typical operating 
and vending structure of many food carts. 
Food carts rely on a minimum number of laborers and produce final goods using 
relatively simple, inexpensive, and readily accessible inputs. These aspects of the food 
cart production function suggest clustered carts stand to gain relatively little in the way 
of labor matching or labor pool and intermediate input sharing, two primary benefits to 
firms from clustering. Remaining sources of agglomerative economies are knowledge 
spillovers on the supply side of the market and one-stop-shopping on the demand side. 
Yet for street food suppliers in a city with such a thriving culinary culture as Portland, 
operating a food cart in a pod is hardly the exclusive path to exploitation of flows of 
culinary knowledge or interaction with other chefs, food critics, and gastronomic 
innovators. Placing an order at any food cart window or restaurant bar around the city 
realizes this objective just as effectively as locating one cart near another, which 
nullifies the need for clustering as a source of knowledge spillovers. Further, with so 
many food carts spread across Portland (especially by the end of the sample in 2011), 
consumers need not necessarily seek out specific cart pods to satisfy their various 
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preferences. In all, the food cart production function does not amend itself to 
agglomerative economies. 
Location 
There is, however, an aspect of location decision that does have serious 
implications for a firm’s ability to survive in the street food market—spatial location 
selection. Two regions of the city in particular, its Northeast and Southeast areas, have 
significant (yet diverging) impacts on exit probability. Based upon the positive 
coefficient and marginal effect of 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 on exit probability, carts located in 
Northeast Portland have a higher probability of exiting the market than do those located 
elsewhere in the city. Conversely, carts located in Southeast Portland have a reduced 
probability of exit compared to their competitors. These impacts are significant, and 
their magnitudes are not trivial. Northeast Portland carts have, on average, a 9.7% 
higher chance of exit, while Southeast Portland carts enjoy an exit probability reduced 
by an average of 5.2% compared to other carts anywhere else in the city. In accordance 
with my previous discussion of cart pods and their effects on exit probability, Southwest 
Portland locations (many of which are defined by large pods in the central business 
district) have no significant impact on exit probability. Northwest, North, and Mobile 
locations also carry no significant effect. This indicates the effects felt in these regions 
are not powerful enough to influence survival of firms located there, unlike elsewhere in 
the city.  
As to the immediate explanations of these trends, it is hypothesized some of 
these dissimilarities are due to differences in demographics across city regions. In the 
Southeast, it is anticipated most local consumers have less disposable income and are of 
a lower median age than anywhere else in the city, making them ideal consumers of 
street food meals. Conversely, Northeast consumers are expected to have more income 
and have a higher median age versus other city regions, suggesting they would be less 
inclined to eat street food compared to other sources of meals, such as restaurants. 
Testing hypotheses regarding the demographic structure of each Portland district is 
beyond the scope of this project, but is achievable through a thorough, painstaking, and 
thoroughly painful examination of census tract data on income, population, and labor 
supply in each region. 
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While I have identified location-specific advantages to firms within urban areas, 
it is impossible to determine the nature of individual firms’ cost functions, and thus 
inappropriate to define a concrete conclusion as to the cost-specific factors that drive 
one cart to locate in a certain region over others in order to minimize production costs. 
However, I speculate that North and Northeast Portland regions are more desirable for 
supply-oriented firms, while Southeast and Southwest regions are more suitable for 
demand-oriented firms. Perhaps food carts following supply-oriented business models 
are less successful than demand-oriented firms. For firms in an industry such as food 
service, this deduction is not unreasonable—consumers generally expect meals 
purchased when dining out to be greater than the sum of their parts. That is food cart 
chefs are expected by consumers to create final goods from cohesive combinations of 
ingredients that are above all else tastier than each individual input alone, making them 
demand-oriented firms.  
There are important nuances to the effect of locational decisions on survival. 
The first of these is the variability of locational choice effects on exit probability over 
time. Take, for example, Figure 20 below, which illustrates predicted exit probabilities 
for individual food carts in three city regions by period of entry into the market. 
Figure 20 
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While this relationship is somewhat volatile, it is clear that for carts in all regions 
considered, exit probability increases over time. This figure indicates that early 
entrants—initial adapters of the food cart model and the first firms to break into the 
street food market—face reduced exit probabilities (on average) compared to those 
firms that attempt to enter in later periods, amid heightened competition from an 
increased number of firms.  
 The trend of higher exit probability over time is reversed, however, when 
considering the time a given firm has spent in the market rather than the time at which it 
entered, as demonstrated by Figure 21 below. Here, a clear relationship between exit 
probability and locational choice can be defined: for all carts, longer market lifespan 
leads to lower probability of exit.  
Figure 21 
 
This effect is reinforced by Figure 22, which plots exit probability by 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛2, the interaction term of 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛. The interaction of a variable indicates the 
rate of change in that variable with respect to the outcome variable15; here, I can say 
                                                        15 Note from Table 1 that the interaction term does not carry a marginal effect. Because this 
variable measures the rate of change in another independent variable, its marginal effects on the 
dependent variable are inseparable from those of 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛, and are thus not calculated. 
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that early entrants into the street food market face exponentially reduced exit 
probabilities than do their less mature counterparts.  
Figure 22  
 
Furthermore, there is yet another angle from which to approach the relationship 
between location decisions and firm survival: through their marginal effects on exit 
probabilities. The marginal effect of a location decisions is a dynamic phenomenon. It 
can be seen from Figure 23 that the later a food cart enters the market, the more 
important its locational choice becomes for its survival, as marginal effects trend away 
from zero over time.  
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Figure 23 
 
Marginal effects of spatial choices diminish as firms advance in age, as 
evidenced by Figure 24 below. This indicates the oldest food carts in the market depend 
less upon specific locational factors for their survival over time in the market. As firms 
increase in age, their initial spatial choices matter less for their survival, while other 
factors become more influential to a firm’s profitability in the long run. 
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Figure 24 
 
In all, over the lifespan of any given food cart regardless of location, exit 
probability increases the later a cart enters the market. Conversely, exit probability 
decreases exponentially as a cart advances in age. Furthermore, the importance of 
locational decisions to firm survival is heightened as the market grows, while it is 
reduced as a firm increases its lifespan as a market participant. When considering 
spatial decisions specifically, food carts in Northeast Portland tend to exit with greater 
probability than do carts elsewhere in the city, while the inverse holds true for carts in 
Southeast Portland. Although estimates of magnitude of effects are statistically 
insignificant for the many food carts in Southwest Portland, exit probabilities there 
closely follow the same pattern for firms in this region as do exit probabilities for firms 
located in Southeast Portland.  
Product Differentiation 
 Locational choice is one of the significant decisions all food carts must make 
when they enter the street food market. Another is the product type that new cart will 
offer its consumers. Examine Figure 25 below. Although it charts predicted exit 
probabilities for individual firms over periods of market entry by type of product 
offered, its trends are remarkably similar to those presented in Figure 20, which 
illustrated this relationship by geographical location. This similarity indicates a strong 
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relationship between market age and survival in general, independent of both location 
and product type—it seems as though there’s a definite market pattern developing.  
Figure 25 
 
It is clear from Figure 25 and regressor coefficients noted in Table 1 that food 
carts producing Asian-themed meals face reduced exit probabilities compared to firms 
of other types. On average, firms offering Asian products exit with a probability 7.6% 
lower than other firms. Food carts producing American meals exit with a 4.8% higher 
probability. Because of the large number of producers of this type, Latin firms are 
included alongside Asian and American food carts in figures charting the relationship 
between product type and survival, even though its effects are statistically insignificant. 
Estimates for Asian and American firms were statistically significant, whereas all other 
product types indicated no effect on exit probability definitively different from zero. 
This implies consumers generally prefer Asian-themed meals to all others and favor 
American plates the least out of all types, but are indifferent between other offerings.  
While it seems as though Portland’s street food consumers express increased 
demand for Asian more than any other type of street food meal, these preferences may 
be influenced by the nature of each product type as well. Certain cuisines—Asian ones 
especially—lend themselves well to rapid preparation in a tiny sidewalk kitchen and 
quick consumption on the street. Historically, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Thai, Indian, 
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and other Southeast Asian cultures have all developed dazzling street food cultures. As 
testimony to the popularity of these gastronomic traditions, Food and Wine recently 
ranked Asian cities as home to nine of the world’s top 19 street food cuisines (Fisher, 
2013). Popular in their native countries for taste, diversity, and affordability, Asian 
street food has thrived like no other anywhere else in the world. Applying Asian 
gastronomy and culinary methodology to street food in Portland, then, is expected to 
produce satisfying results for both consumers and producers.  
 While a firm’s product type influences the determination of survival as the street 
food market has developed over time, the relationship between food type and survival 
over the lifespan of a firm is less distinct. As with locational effects, the longer a firm 
has operated in the market, the less of a chance it has of realizing negative profits and 
exiting. From Figure 26 below, it is clear that Asian producers routinely exit less 
frequently than carts of other types. But exit probabilities are more randomly distributed 
based upon food type, suggesting that location, more so than product type, determines 
success for food carts. 
Figure 26 
 
 Food type choices, like locational choices, vary in their marginal effects as firms 
and the market age, and near-identical patterns in the marginal effect of food type 
variables on survival are seen as firm lifespan increases. Marginal effects of product 
 64  
choices over time are not displayed so as to avoid repetition of trends already illustrated 
by Figure 23.  
Figure 27 
 
Lifespan 
I have discussed the important implications for survival carried by choices of 
both food type and geographic location in the street food market. In the course of my 
examination of these aspects of firm characteristics, I have touched upon the importance 
of the age of a firm to its survival. However, the exact nature of this relationship can be 
fleshed out even further. I have shown that as firms age, their exit probability decreases. 
I have also shown that individuating characteristics, at first so vital to survival, decline 
in importance with age. But when do those effects begin to occur? 
As it turns out, there are two major milestones in the market lifespan of a food 
cart. The first of these is the definite age at which exit probability for that cart sharply 
and significantly decreases. At this point, I can say that firms have reached the threshold 
of market lifespan above which they are much less likely to exit, regardless of the 
specific locational or product choice the firm has made. The second is the point at 
which that exit probability begins to rise. Even though chances of survival increase as a 
firm ages in general, specific adjustments made in the first two years are important 
enough to their success that their results are statistically distinguishable from zero. 
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These conclusions were established through an alternate specification of the basic 
regression model using a series of dummy variables for lifespans of greater than six, 12, 
18, and 24, and 36 months. Results of this process can be found in the Appendix.  
Of these, the 12-month indicator returned a significant result, indicating carts 
that survive past one year of operation see significantly different exit probabilities than 
do carts that do not survive at least this amount of time. Moreover, both the coefficient 
estimate and marginal effect of the 12-month dummy indicated a negative association; 
for carts with market lifespans greater than 12 months, exit probability is significantly 
reduced. However, firms experience an increase in exit probability after 24 months in 
operation. After one year in the market, food carts have a lower probability of exiting 
the market; but after two years, this probability rises again, although by a noticeably 
reduced magnitude. Three years in the market makes no impact on firm survival.  
These phenomena possibly relate to differences in short and long run 
production. Recall that in the short run, suppliers are constrained by at least one of their 
factors of production being held more or less constant. Whether it is the number of 
employees, amount of raw ingredients purchased, or stock of physical capital used in 
production, altering levels of inputs into a production function takes time. More 
importantly, it also takes time for principals to even determine the amount to which they 
wish to change these factors to attempt to maximize profit. Over 12 full months of 
survivable operation (not necessarily profitable, but at least not overwhelmingly 
negative), firm owners have enough time to alter their production functions to levels 
they expect to be more profitable. This is the logical scenario after 12 months of 
production. It stands to reason that after a full year of operation, food cart owners 
understand their business and their market better than they did at the outset, and are able 
to make more informed business decisions. 
But if the correct adjustments are not made (or if incorrect adjustments are made 
instead) firms harm their chances of survival. And more often than not, food cart 
owners get them wrong. The 24-month dummy variable carries a significant, positive 
coefficient, indicating that after two years in the market—enough time for factors of 
production to be altered again—exit probabilities increase. It seems cart owners are out-
smarting themselves. Principals may attempt to alter their input mixes again after an 
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additional 12 months of operation, based upon the success their adjustments brought 
them a year ago; conversely, satisfied with their progress, owners fail to apply the same 
analysis and adjustment process to their production function they did previously, and, 
consequently, the fate of their firm suffers. Note from Table 1 that the average age of all 
firms sampled was approximately 21 months; most firms did not even survive long 
enough to fully experience the effects of their 24-month adjustments—that’s how bad 
they were. 
An alternate explanation of this trend could be that cart owners and operators 
begin to lose their sense of rationality after a prolonged period in the market. After 12 
months of operation, some proper adjustments are made, and mortality declines. 
However, after two years, running a food cart is simply not worth it. Regardless of 
profitability, principals decide to exit the market in pursuit of other opportunities, as 
suddenly, sweating inside an airstream trailer all day for relatively little money loses the 
appeal it once had, and firms exit even if they are still marginally profitable. From a 
purely economic standpoint, this is not always a rational decision, unless there is an 
even more profitable alternative to food cart production.  
But for certain street food vendors, there is. Some food carts are conceived and 
operated with the equally irrational long run goal of exiting early, during a period of 
high profitability. Although there is more profit to be had from continued operation, 
select street food salesmen have another objective besides profit maximization for their 
time in the market: to earn just enough money to sufficiently fund another, more costly 
business venture—a restaurant. Certain would-be restaurateurs are prohibited from 
entry by significant fixed costs, so as a way to deepen their capital (both physical and 
human), they embark upon a more achievable business venture first. After two years at 
the wheel a food cart, these chefs have acquired the money and improved the skills 
necessary to open a formal restaurant. This model works: five food carts-turned-
restaurants made Willamette Week’s best of the city restaurant guide in 2013. 
Population and Unemployment 
To this point, I have reached several important conclusions and heightened my 
understanding of firm functionality in Portland’s street food market. I have detailed the 
importance of specific firm characteristics to survival and seen how the effects of these 
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features change over time, all while analyzing only those deterministic variables 
contained in my firm-level index. My index of market characteristics, for its part, also 
reveals some important facets of street food in Portland.  
The first variable in the market-level index, 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, is relativity 
unimportant for food cart survival. Although its coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant, its magnitude is so close to zero that its effect is more or less irrelevant. The 
number of people living in the Portland area does affect certain aspects of the city’s 
street food market, but is hardly directly influential for individual firm survival.  
The effects of 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 on survival are, however, more interesting. 
Coefficient estimates and marginal effects on exit probability are positive, and logically, 
if more Portland residents are without jobs, they will be less likely to purchase meals 
from food carts, opting for even less expensive home cooking instead. Food carts are 
especially attractive to certain out-of-work entrepreneurs and cooks seeking 
opportunities for income during periods of severe economic recession considered in this 
study, as I have discussed. But the positive marginal effect of Portland’s unemployment 
rate on food cart exit probability may serve as a warning to the droves of chefs and 
entrepreneurs that have turned to Portland’s carts in periods of high unemployment and 
recession. Entering the market under these conditions induces exit, meaning opening a 
food cart as direct, personal means of money making may not be as secure of a business 
decision as it might seem. Over time in this market, as unemployment increased, so did 
the number of food carts, heightening competition, and increasing average exit 
probability. 
Income 
The most compelling result of estimation of market-level variables is the 
coefficient and marginal effect of 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 on firm survival. The positive polarity on 
these estimations indicates that, all else held constant, as personal income increases, so 
too does the probability that a given food cart will exit. Thus, as consumers earn more 
money, they actually choose to purchase fewer meals from food carts. Street food meals 
are therefore inferior goods—ones that become less popular among increasingly 
affluent consumers. This is a logical conclusion; eaters with more money will more 
likely prefer to dine in more expensive full-service restaurants.  
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It is therefore something of a surprise food carts are so popular, since Portland is 
a relatively affluent city. In the 2007-2013 American Community Survey, The Portland-
Vancouver-Hillsboro MSA had the 23rd highest concentration of households with 
earnings in the top 5% of the national median household distribution, out of 273 MSA’s 
(Bee, 2013). Culture, it seems, outweighs cash flow in Portland, and despite relatively 
elevated income levels, consumers prefer to eat at food carts. This is reflected by the 
small magnitude of the 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 coefficient—although street food is an inferior good, 
consumers do not strongly discriminate against street food based upon their income.  
Overall, my regression model of food cart exit probability leads to some 
compelling conclusions as to the nature of survival and the details of operation for firms 
across different stages of individual and market growth. For instance, Portland’s 
proclaimed cart pods actually have no significant effect on the success or failure of any 
of the firms of which they are comprised. Southeast Portland neighborhoods are the best 
suited to sustain food carts, perhaps due to their younger, poorer demographics. 
Portlanders on the whole seem to prefer their street food in Asian varieties, which 
happens to be a culinary genre especially suited to food cart marketing and munching. 
Those carts that entered the market in its early stages face reduced exit probabilities, 
and all of Portland’s food carts increase their chances of survival as they advance their 
age in the market. Most important to this progression of exit probability over firm 
lifespan is the milestone of one full year of operation without exit, after which point 
surviving carts enjoy reductions in their probability of exit. But when given the chance 
to adjust their production processes over time, cart owners more often than not made 
poor business decisions, and actually increased their exit probability after two years in 
the market. In all, these patterns are not random, but systematic. 
Explanations and Interpretations 
 So what does all this mean? My ultimate goal is to comprehend how food carts 
function, and an econometric estimation is a crucial part of this objective. But can I 
extend model results beyond simple lists of numbers and explain the relationships they 
express? The answer to this question will not only complete my analysis of Portland’s 
street food market, but also test hypotheses of theoretical economic fundamentals by 
weighing them against the standard of real world market operation.  
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First, I have shown that early entrants into a market are less likely to fail, and 
thus more likely to earn positive economic profit. This is in accordance with 
fundamental economic theories regarding the nature of product market cycles. Kessides 
(1991) demonstrates theoretically as well as empirically that in competitive product 
markets, entry rates respond to profits realized by incumbent firms, noting that both are 
higher in the early stages of a market’s existence, and—crucially—both decline over 
time. This indicates average profit is indeed higher for firms entering in the early stages 
of a market’s product life cycle. But why? 
Recall my earlier discussion of Mueller’s (1972) theories regarding profitability 
in the face of uncertainty. Early entrants stand to gain more from their operation in a 
market, as “profits accrue to those entrepreneurs who possess the information, intuition, 
or courage and luck to make correct investment decisions in the face of uncertainty.” 
But as markets solidify over time, risk decreases, and, as has been established, 
opportunities for profit evaporate; consequently, exit increases. This trend is exactly 
what has happened in Portland’s street food market. Examine Figure 28, which plots the 
average lifespan of firms that have actually exited the market by the period in which 
they entered. It is clear for those firms that entered in earlier periods, average lifespan is 
much longer than for those that entered in later periods. Over time, fewer food carts last 
longer, and more firms earn less profit. 
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Figure 28 
 
Second, I have indicated that as Portland’s street food market developed over 
time, the marginal effects of individuating factors such as location and product choice 
became more important for firm survival. This is mainly due to the returns to firms from 
innovation: initially, new products sold in developing markets are revolutionary, and for 
this reason attractive to consumers. Producers stand to gain more from simply entering 
the market, regardless of their location and product choice decisions. But as novelty 
fades, new developments in the product market produce only marginal improvements, 
and the innovation premium declines (Mueller, 1972). Firms no longer profit to the 
extent early entrants did from production alone, and must seek profit in other ways—
such as by entering into new market niches or defining a specific type of product and 
identity for itself. This mirrors the type of relationship between product types and 
number of firms expressed theoretically by the Bowley model of product differentiation. 
Furthermore, as the underlying level of knowledge among producers in an 
industry increases, entry becomes motivated less by profits from basic entry into the 
market and more by entry into specific niches of the market. This circumstance explains 
the observed dispersion of firms across the city as the market has grown. While the 
number of clustered firms grew dramatically over six years, so too did the number of 
locations where firms cluster, and, generally, new firms commanded more and more 
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new locations across the city over time as they attempted to separate themselves from 
their competition.  
Considering another component of time, I also noticed that as a given firm ages, 
its probability of exit declines. It is established that market forces select against firms 
that are consistently unable to produce efficiently; firms that don’t make money don’t 
last. However, as Bellone et al. (2008) find, “this selection process is more severe for 
young firms because industry structures favor the survival of mature firms.” Contrary to 
their older counterparts, new entrants are confronted by a lack of reputation among 
consumers, are without established product distribution channels, and operate without 
full information regarding their relative efficiency and profit maximizing conditions. 
This lack of operating information especially is painfully obvious in the results of the 12 
and 24-month dummy model, which indicated most new food cart owners do not always 
make profitable or rational business decisions. Moreover, this trend of market selection 
explains the decrease in marginal effects of various location and product type decisions 
over the lifespan of a firm. As a firm ages, these factors become less important because 
the market itself improves survival probabilities for more mature firms. 
Market selection mechanisms do not work to the advantage of young firms, all 
of which suffered a high mortality rate in the sample. Yet perversely, markets depend 
upon their newest entrants to continue their development. Free from pressure by 
innovative and daring entrants, incumbents with proven potential for profitability will 
tend to crystallize their outputs unless forced to advance by the threat of deductions in 
profit young firms pose (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001). Innovation in product 
specifications, organizational structure, and even marketing techniques are all essential 
to market evolution because they remove barriers to growth posed by uncertainty and 
lack of information and are paths to positive profit, which motivates the continued 
development of industries (Mueller, 1972). By necessity, young firms must make these 
advancements if they are to survive: “innovations available to non-incumbent firms are 
a mechanism for entry insofar as they offset advantages of earlier entry by incumbents” 
(Agarwal & Gort, 1996). 
Third, from my model, it can be seen that the marginal importance of 
heterogeneity to survival is considerable for young firms yet considerably reduced for 
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older incumbents, a direct testimony to the vulnerability of new entrants. To explain 
some of the liability of new entrants with respect to their individual characteristics, a 
return to basic microeconomics is in order. As Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005) explain, 
in their first periods of production, new firms typically operate with average total 
costs16 above their marginal revenues17 from sales, and must recoup their fixed costs of 
production with a sustained period of positive revenues. Simultaneously, variable costs 
are higher as a result of firms’ inability to adjust their input mixes in the short run. But 
over time, average total costs decline, expenses on fixed factors of production such as 
equipment and food carts themselves are recovered with revenues from sales, and 
output can be adjusted so as to maximize profit given the market price of a standard 
street food meal.  
At this point, firms can earn enough profit to sustain their enterprises, and 
therefore have incentive to continue operation in the market. After several years, 
ultimate success is contingent less upon differentiating features and more upon a firm’s 
ability to define a production function that allows it to produce where its marginal 
revenue is at least equal to its marginal cost and thus avoid negative economic profit 
(Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005). This progression holds true for virtually every firm in 
virtually every open market, regardless of good or geography, and is the fundamental 
starting point of any economic analysis of market structure or firm conduct. 
However, I expect there to be more to it than that. As Agarwal and Gort (1996) 
state, in modern industrial economics, “the pattern of entry [and exit] cannot be 
adequately explained in terms of U-shaped cost curves and as a response to market 
growth in the context of a well-defined optimal scale of firm.” Industry dynamics and 
product market developments have been identified as other variable determinants of 
mortality for both young and old firms, neither of which are explicitly addressed here. 
Thus, the necessity for further understanding of the specific determinants of survival for 
young firms in particular is crucial to the continued study of industrial organization. 
Bellone et al. (2008) and Agarwal and Audretsch (2001), among others, have made                                                         16 The total cost incurred by a firm to produce all units divided by the number of units of output 
that firm produces (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 17 The change in amount of money a firm gets from selling its product that results from selling 
one more unit of output (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2005). 
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noteworthy progress in this pursuit, but additional gains in the field could be 
accomplished through a supplementary analysis of this very food cart dataset. 
Conclusion 
Food carts, like all other firms across all other markets, exist because people 
want what they have to offer. In Portland, demand originates from a unique mix of 
emphasis on high quality gastronomy, innovative individual entrepreneurship, 
regulatory freedom, and economic recession. The result of this fusion is explosive 
growth in a market that was relatively flat and almost entirely undeveloped only ten 
years ago, yet today continues to perform dynamically and vigorously. The terms of this 
growth and the determinants of success and failure for the firms that make up this 
market are complex, yet their characteristics can be broken down into concrete, 
comprehensible concepts reaffirmed by accepted economic theories. 
This final point is the ultimate import of this study. As economic theory claims, 
people respond to incentives, and firms invariably attempt to maximize their profits. 
Decisions are made on the understanding that the marginal benefit of an action exceeds 
its marginal cost. I attempted to test the extent to which these idealized relationships 
apply in the seemingly unpredictable real world.  
Food carts may be an unexpected market in which to test these theories. It’s easy 
to glance secondhand at the mismatched corrugated iron roofs, the old trailers propped 
up on cement blocks, and the hand-scrawled menus that identify street food vendors. 
It’s easy to watch their seemingly indiscriminate sprawl across a city and dismiss their 
economic agency and rationality. Yet while their development may appear haphazard, 
Portland’s food carts exhibit the carefully planned, economically efficient, and precise 
products of economic principles on display at every street corner.  
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appendix 
 As a reference to the discussion of exit probabilities after 12 and 24 months in 
operation, see Table 2. Similar to Table 1, this table illustrates the results of probit 
estimations for five models including variables for survival over discrete operational 
milestones. Especially important in this table is the insignificance of estimates for all 
but the 12 and 24-month indicator variables, including the 18-month indicator. This 
implies survival for 18 months makes no difference to mortality, whereas milestones 
both before and after this period are significant. This lends further validity to the 
significance of 12 and 24-month dummy models. 
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Table 2 
Exit Probability Model Estimates: With Survival Milestone Indicators 
 
Variable 6 Month Survival 12 Month Survival 18 Month Survival 24 Month Survival 36 Month Survival  Estimated Impact on Exit Probability Pod 0.252 0.311* 0.253 0.264 0.263 (0.175) (0.181) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) Location: Northeast 0.598** 0.498** 0.612** 0.603** 0.611** (0.247) (0.250) (0.244) (0.246) (0.245) Location: Southeast -0.386** -0.394** -0.380** -0.370** -0.370** (0.177) (0.186) (0.177) (0.178) (0.177) Type: American 0.336** 0.283 0.332** 0.315* 0.344** (0.167) (0.173) (0.167) (0.168) (0.167) Type: Asian -0.585** -0.574** -0.585** -0.565** -0.564** (0.238) (0.255) (0.238) (0.240) (0.239) Lifespan -0.331*** -0.266*** -0.335*** -0.360*** -0.331*** (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.032) Lifespan2 0.001*** -01.10x10-4 0.001*** 0.001*** 9.64x10-4*** (3.20x10-5) (3.81x10-4) (3.33x10-4) (3.26x10-4) (2.92x10-4) Population -1.88x10-4*** -2.15x10-4*** -1.89x10-4*** -1.96x10-4*** -1.81x10-4*** (1.74x10-5) (2.03x10-5) (1.78x10-5) (1.78x10-5) (1.88x10-5) Personal Income 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** (3.85 x10-4) (3.83 x10-4) (3.88 x10-4) (3.86 x10-4) (4.37 x10-4) Unemployment 1.032*** 1.308*** 1.046*** 1.120*** 1.055*** (0.133) (0.156) (0.131) (0.136) (0.132) 6 Months 0.085 - - - - (0.267) 12 Months - -2.108*** - - - (0.429) 18 Months - - 0.134 - - (0.326) 24 Months - - - 0.718** - (0.364) 36 Months - - - - 0.663 (0.779) Constant 312.7*** 367.4*** 314.7*** 322.5*** 304.4*** (25.94) (33.30) (26.48) (26.56) (26.96) Observations 706 706 706 706 706 Pseudo R2 0.633 0.663 0.633 0.637 0.634 Complete Successes 61 82 61 63 56 Complete Failures 0 0 0 0 0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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